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Congressional Appropriations 
and the 
Electoral Connection 
D. Roderick Kiewiet 
California Institute of Technology 
Mathew D. McCubbins 
University of Texas at Austin 
Congressional scholars have frequently reported dramatic shifts in the mood of Congress 
toward federal spending. In seeking to explain these fluctuations in congressional moods, we 
develop and estimate an "electoral connection" model of the congressional appropriations 
process. In this model appropriations decisions are seen to be the product of the responses of 
reelection-seeking members of Congress to the key political and economic variables in their 
environment. 
Analyses of appropriations for thirty-seven federal agencies between fiscal years 1948 and 
1979 provided broad support for our hypotheses. First, Congress has been more generous in 
awarding appropriations during election years than during nonelection years. Appropria- 
tions are also influenced by prevailing economic conditions. Higher unemployment leads to 
higher levels of appropriations, especially for public works agencies. Conversely, Congress 
has responded to high rates of inflation by holding down appropriations. And as in other 
areas of public policy, parties matter: the larger the percentage of Democrats in the House of 
Representatives, the more funds agencies were appropriated. The strong empirical support 
garnered by our electoral connection model thus adds some much needed balance to the con- 
ventional incrementalist view of federal government spending. 
INTRODUCTION 
In The Power of the Purse, Fenno (1966) described Congress as usually 
being in an "economy mood." During the eighteen years Fenno observed 
* This paper has benefited greatly from the advice and assistance of Bruce Cain. Jeff 
Dubin, David Grether, Richard McKelvey, Doug Rivers, and Quong Vuong provided 
econometric advice. We would also like to thank Bob Bates, Richard Fenno, John Ferejohn, 
Morris Fiorina, Ed Green, Peter Gourevitch, Mark Kamlet, Keith Krehbiel, Allan Meltzer, 
Terry Moe, Roger Noll, Ben Page, Howard Rosenthal, Alan Schwartz, and the anonymous 
referees for their valuable comments and criticisms. 
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appropriations politics in Congress, the virtue of budgetary frugality was 
exemplified by the House Appropriations Committee and magnified by 
the powerful role this committee played. Sometimes, though, a different 
mood would overtake Congress. Hesitating to call it a "spending mood," 
Fenno described it instead as a more "permissive" attitude toward spend- 
ing. During such periods Congress would become anxious to avoid the 
pitfalls of false economy and would strive to make sure that authorized 
programs received adequate levels of funding. 
Much has changed since the period of Fenno's analysis. Entitlement 
programs have experienced tremendous growth. Standing budget com- 
mittees oversee the complex routine of the new budgetary process, while 
the appropriations committees, according to Schick (1980), have become 
"subdued guardians." Nevertheless, shifts in congressional attitudes 
toward federal spending still occur. In 1981 the Reagan administration 
won congressional approval for substantial cuts in the budgets of several 
domestic agencies and programs. Similar efforts since then, however, 
have been much less successful. 
What accounts for these shifts in the mood of Congress toward spend- 
ing? Unfortunately, previous theory and research on budgetary politics 
provide us with little guidance as to what the causes of these fluctuations 
might be. Inspired by organizational theories of satisficing behavior and 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1957; Lindblom, 1961), research on the 
budgetary process has stressed the importance of standard bureaucratic 
operating procedures and programmatic inertia (Wildavsky, 1964; Davis, 
Dempster, and Wildavsky, 1966). This work has been one of the most 
fruitful research programs in political science, yielding valuable insights 
into the internal dynamics of budgetary decision making. It has, 
however, focused relatively little attention upon the influence of Congress 
and congressional politics on the budgetary process. In this paper we 
develop and test an empirical model of the congressional appropriations 
process which is broadly informed by the "electoral connection" view of 
legislative behavior (Mayhew, 1974; Fiorina, 1977). For present pur- 
poses the key feature of this view is that members of Congress, desirous of 
reelection, respond to the demands and exigencies of their environment in 
such a way as to maximize the probability of this happy occurrence. 
The major contribution of this study will not be the discovery of 
previously unsuspected sources of influence upon appropriations deci- 
sions; Fenno and others have suggested what many of these variables 
might be. The question of how strongly major political and economic 
variables affect important policy outputs such as appropriations is, 
however, very much at issue in current political research. Most impor- 
tant, empirical support for our electoral connection model will add some 
much needed balance to the conventional incrementalist view of 
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budgetary politics, a view which has tended to ignore the influence of ex- 
ternal political demands upon government spending decisions. 
AN ELECTORAL CONNECTION MODEL 
OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS 
In developing our electoral connection model of the congressional ap- 
propriations process, we make a number of assumptions about voters, 
members of Congress, and congressional policymaking. These assump- 
tions, which have undergirded a vast amount of congressional scholarship 
over the last decade or so, all grow out of the basic premise of Mayhew's 
(1974) analysis -that the structure and behavior of Congress can best be 
understood as the consequences of reelection seeking by individual 
members of Congress.' 
The appropriations which are awarded to agencies of the federal 
government buy goods and services which benefit various groups in soci- 
ety. Some agencies benefit groups which are quite broad and diffuse; 
most noncriminals, for instance, probably benefit from the activities of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Other agencies, of course, benefit 
extremely narrow clientele, concentrated in either specific geographic 
locations (beneficiaries of the Bureau of Reclamation, for example) or 
defined by specific social or demographic characteristics (such as the aged 
or disabled). In general, concentrated, narrowly defined groups will be 
better able to overcome the collective action problems which impede 
organizing and lobbying (Olson, 1965). 
These various groups in society base their support of incumbents at least 
in part upon retrospective evaluations of the levels of benefits conferred 
on them by federal programs. The extensive literature on retrospective 
voting has generated a great deal of evidence that voters have fairly large 
positive discount factors and that they are also "myopic"; that is, they dis- 
count the future costs of present benefits (Nordhaus, 1975; Fair, 1978; 
Kiewiet, 1983). We will thus assume this to be true of voters and con- 
tributors regardless of the size and nature of the groups with which they 
are associated. 
Members of Congress, desirous of reelection, seek to maximize the elec- 
I As Bueno de Mesquita (1981) points out, any empirical analysis of a collectivity (commit- 
tees, legislatures, nations, etc.) must address the generic problem of preference aggregation by 
assuming either that the collectivity chooses in accordance with the preferences of a dictator 
or those of representative individuals (the median voter, for example). We adopt the latter, 
assuming that the appropriations decisions made by Congress are nonnegatively responsive to 
the preferences of individual legislators. The essence of this assumption is that the legislative 
process is not perverse; that is, if one or more members of Congress prefer to increase spending 
for some agency, ceteris paribus, the collective choice will not be to decrease the agency's 
funding. 
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toral support (campaign contributions, votes, etc.) they receive from the 
various beneficiaries of government goods and services. The level of sup- 
port received from each clientele group is assumed to be a nondecreasing 
function of the appropriations awarded to the agency which benefits 
them. We also assume, however, that members of Congress experience 
declining marginal returns in electoral support from the appropriations 
awarded to each agency. In order to maximize their reelection prospects, 
incumbents will thus choose appropriation levels which equate marginal 
returns in electoral support across federal agencies. This will result, 
other things being equal, in a disproportionate share of benefits (relative 
to the size of their membership) flowing to those groups which are better 
able to organize, make campaign contributions, and deliver votes. 
In contrast, the costs of these goods and services provided by agencies of 
the federal government are quite diffuse, as they are financed out of 
general revenue collected from all U.S. taxpayers. To be sure, members 
of Congress may make tradeoffs between the campaign resources 
garnered through their support of various federal benefit programs and 
votes obtained by decreasing taxes. However, the fact that benefits tend 
to be concentrated and costs diffuse, combined with the fact that the 
federal government faces a "soft" budget constraint (it may and almost 
always does spend more than it takes in), means that appropriations deci- 
sions will not reflect the true tax costs of federal benefit programs 
(Wildavsky, 1975; Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnson, 1981; McCubbins 
and Sullivan, 1984). 
Given these assumptions, then, what are the major variables which 
would presumably impinge upon the appropriations decisions of a 
legislature composed of individuals seeking to survive in this sort of 
political environment? Perhaps what comes most readily to mind as a 
source of changing congressional moods toward spending is the electoral 
calendar. As the salience of electoral imperatives (raising money and 
garnering votes) increases with the proximity of election day, incumbents 
will become increasingly anxious to channel government benefits to their 
constituents (or at least, alternatively, less anxious to cut such benefits). 
Such benefits, furthermore, will become politically more salient to 
constituents as the election nears. This tendency will be reinforced, of 
course, by members of Congress knowing that over time beneficiary 
groups discount what they have received. Maximizing the amount of 
electoral support earned by the flow of government goods and services 
thus indicates "heaping" these benefits later on in the electoral cycle 
(Nordhaus, 1975; Tufte, 1978). Specifically, then, we would expect 
Congress to be more generous in its treatment of agency budgets in elec- 
tion years than in nonelection years. 
An electoral connection view of congressional decision making further 
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suggests that the approach of election day will have a larger impact upon 
the appropriations of agencies which supply goods and services of a highly 
divisible nature. As the returns to political action increase, the incentives 
for particular groups to overcome their political action problems also in- 
crease. If this collective action takes the form of campaign contributions 
and other types of political support, then those programs which supply 
concentrated benefits to well-organized groups will yield incumbents a 
higher marginal rate of electoral support at a given level of funding than 
will programs which supply benefits to a wide segment of society.2 
Benefits which are highly divisible in nature, then, can be directly 
channeled to politically important groups in incumbents' constituencies. 
To be sure, few members of Congress ever witness with equanimity cuts 
in programs which aid key interest groups in their districts. But we 
would expect calls for economy in these areas to fall upon deaf ears as the 
second session comes to a close, as such groups are the major source of the 
money and labor members need for their reelection campaigns. The 
surest beneficiaries of election-year permissiveness, furthermore, should 
be public works agencies, as individual members can claim full, personal 
credit for the jobs and dollars brought back home by public works projects 
(Mayhew, 1974; Fiorina, 1977). 
Second, changing congressional moods toward federal spending should 
be a function of changing economic conditions. Voters hold those in 
power responsible for bad economic times; so fluctuations in the nation's 
economy clearly affect the outcomes of congressional elections (Kramer, 
1971). The campaign decisions of both incumbents and potential 
challengers as well as the behavior of contributors give considerable 
weight to this fact of political life (Jacobson and Kernell, 1981). Fenno 
(1966), furthermore, believed that the 1954 and 1958 recessions helped 
trigger a permissive mood in those years. Also, Davis, Dempster, and 
Wildavsky (1974) report that the predictive power of their budget equa- 
tions was often enhanced by the inclusion of assorted economic variables. 
There are, of course, many plausible ways to specify how appropria- 
tions decisions respond to economic conditions; neither politicians nor 
macroeconomists hold a consensual view of prescriptive fiscal policy. At 
least some members of both groups, however, hold that governments 
should decrease spending in response to inflation and increase spending in 
response to unemployment. Insofar as high levels of government spend- 
ing are perceived by voters and contributors to induce inflationary 
2 That the marginal rate of political support derived from appropriations is increasing in 
the "divisibleness" of the agency's benefits does not imply that agencies which supply rela- 
tively indivisible benefits receive no appropriations. This means only that the latter type of 
agencies will receive disproportionately less appropriations than their numbers would other- 
wise suggest. The presence of an election year simply serves to exacerbate this bias. 
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pressures, we will hypothesize that Congress responds to high rates of in- 
flation by appropriating less to government agencies. Conversely, to the 
extent that voters and contributors believe the Keynesian axioms, we will 
hypothesize that high rates of unemployment lead Congress to award 
higher levels of appropriations to government programs and agencies. 
As was the case with election-year considerations, high levels of 
unemployment should make reelection-minded members of Congress 
even more solicitous about funding for agencies which channel benefits 
directly to their districts - especially job-creating public works projects 
for which they can claim full credit. The initiation of new public works 
projects, the acceleration of work on projects in progress, or a sizable in- 
crease in the number of federal dollars flowing to important economic in- 
terests in their districts provides at least some shelter from the ill political 
climate engendered by high rates of joblessness. Bad times, by enlarging 
the differences in marginal returns in electoral support from appropria- 
tions for programs which supply highly divisible benefits vis-a-vis those 
which do not, serve to exacerbate the chronic institutional bias of the 
Congress toward providing divisible, constituency-oriented benefits 
(Ferejohn, 1974; Arnold, 1979; Shepsle, 1983; Shepsle and Weingast, 
1984). We will thus hypothesize that those agencies which supply such 
benefits, especially public works agencies, will be treated more gener- 
ously in periods of high unemployment than line agencies whose benefits 
are much less divisible in nature. 
We might expect, similarly, that inflation-induced budgetary pressures 
will take a relatively larger slice from the appropriations of line agencies 
which supply largely indivisible benefits than from other agencies, in- 
cluding public works, whose benefits are relatively divisible. This may 
not be the case, however, as inflation and unemployment have very dif- 
ferent distributional consequences. It is well known how the costs of 
unemployment are distributed; those whose employment opportunities 
are most severely diminished by a recession tend to be working class, in 
construction and other credit-sensitive industries, younger, and minority 
group members. It is they, conversely, who are also the beneficiaries of 
job-creating federal programs. The net distributional consequences of 
inflation, in contrast, are much smaller and far less systematic (Piachaud, 
1978). This lack of distributional consequences may mean that a high in- 
flation rate does not alter the relative attractiveness of providing benefits 
of a divisible nature versus those which are more indivisible. 
Another political variable which we would expect to exert a clear, con- 
tinuous influence upon appropriations decisions is party politics; in 
general, Democrats prefer to spend more than Republicans. In the years 
during the Truman administration in which they controlled Congress, the 
Republicans slashed agency estimates, especially in the areas of labor pro- 
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grams and public power (Fenno, 1966). Democratic Congresses, in con- 
trast, generally cut much less from OMB estimates and often appropriated 
more than OMB had requested. We will hypothesize, then, that as the 
percentage of Democrats in Congress increases, so does the amount Con- 
gress appropriates to federal agencies (all else constant). 
At first glance this hypothesis would seem to run counter to the spirit of 
an electoral connection model. By this view incumbents' reelection pros- 
pects depend ultimately upon their ability to satisfy the demands of their 
constituency. The legislative behavior literature, though, has tradi- 
tionally posed "party" and "constituency" as alternative, often contradic- 
tory sources of influence upon legislators. It is our sense, however, that 
party and constituency pressures coincide far more often than not. While 
it is true that congressional districts represented by Democrats often 
closely resemble other districts which have Republican representatives, 
we are confident that the reelection constituencies of Democratic and 
Republican legislators do reliably differ (Fiorina, 1974; Fenno, 1978; 
Poole and Rosenthal, 1983). The hypothesized tendency for Democrats 
to support higher levels of spending than Republicans can thus be at- 
tributed at least in part to differences in their constituencies. 
Still, at certain junctures adherence to party policy priorities will run 
counter to the electoral imperative of procuring benefits for one's district. 
Indeed, it is frequently argued that differences between Republicans and 
Democrats melt away when funding for agencies which supply highly 
divisible, constituency-oriented benefits is considered. Shepsle (1983), 
for instance, quotes David Stockman's statement: "There is no such thing 
as a fiscal conservative when it comes to his district or his subcommittee." 
We will hypothesize, then, that in such cases constituency wins out over 
party, and that appropriations for public works and other constituency- 
oriented agencies are relatively insensitive to the partisan composition of 
Congress. 
Appropriations decisions, of course, are not solely in the hands of Con- 
gress; federal funding levels reflect the preferences of the president as 
well. Interaction between Congress and the president resembles a 
bilateral bargaining game, which, for a number of reasons, should be a 
cooperative one (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1984). There should thus exist 
a strong, positive relationship between what the OMB requests and what 
Congress appropriates. First and foremost, OMB estimates reflect the 
preferences of presidents; Congress must take this into account, as 
presidents can always veto appropriations bills which they find objec- 
tionable. It is also true, though, that if the OMB (which we assume to be 
agent of the president) is to maximize its influence over the budgetary for- 
tunes of executive agencies it must anticipate Congress's response to the 
estimates it submits. Finally, it is likely that the executive responds to 
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many of the same exogenous political and economic variables which in- 
fluence Congress. For these reasons, then, a satisfactory model of con- 
gressional appropriations decisions must not incorporate OMB estimates 
as another exogenous variable. The actions of these institutions must in- 
stead be modeled as endogenous to each other. 
Inclusion of the OMB budget estimate into our model introduces an ad- 
ditional complication which arises from the transition from one ad- 
ministration to another. A few days before leaving office in January 
1977, for example, Jerry Ford submitted budget requests to Congress for 
fiscal year 1978. The president who had to approve fiscal 1978 ap- 
propriations bills, however, was Jimmy Carter. The same situation oc- 
curred in 1961 (fiscal year 1962), while the reverse (a Republican suc- 
ceeding a Democrat) occurred in 1953 and 1969 (fiscal years 1954 and 
1970). If the preferences of the president reflect his party and Congress is 
solicitous of his preferences, the transition from a Democratic to a 
Republican administration should result, ceteris paribus, in Congress 
awarding agencies lower levels of appropriations than if a Democrat had 
remained in office. Transition to a Democratic administration, con- 
versely, should result in federal agencies receiving more money than if the 
Republicans had retained control of the White House. Our model should 
thus include a term which registers the transition from an administration 
of one party to that of another. Such a variable will serve as an addi- 
tional measure of presidential influence upon congressional decision mak- 
ing. 
DATA 
The electoral connection model we have developed implies that 
election-year pressures and unemployment will have a larger impact upon 
appropriations for public works agencies and other agencies which supply 
highly divisible, constituency-oriented benefits than upon appropriations 
for agencies whose benefits are relatively indivisible in nature. The in- 
fluence of party policy priorities-and perhaps inflation-should be 
smaller for the former type of agencies. We therefore collected OMB 
estimates and final appropriations figures from fiscal years 1948 to 1979 
for four public works agencies, fifteen other constituency-oriented agen- 
cies, and eighteen agencies which provide largely indivisible benefits. 
Both sets of figures were reported in various regular annual appropria- 
tions acts. Many agencies often receive additional funding in supplemen- 
tal and deficiencies acts. These figures are almost always quite small, 
however, and including them in the agencies' yearly appropriations totals 
would have little effect upon the results of this analysis.3 
3 In a handful of instances agency appropriations which customarily appeared in a regular 
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The thirty-seven agencies listed in table 1 contain all but three of the 
thirty-six agencies examined by Fenno.4 Agencies were assigned to one 
category or the other on the basis of the description of their activities con- 
tained in the United States Government Manual and other sources. As 
Fenno noted, most of the agencies which supply large proportions of 
divisible, constituency-oriented benefits are either in the Agriculture and 
Interior departments or are considered in the Public Works Bill.5 In 
many cases the placement of an agency in the first category is also cor- 
roborated by the scholarly attention it has received in the "subgovern, 
ment" literature that documents the symbiotic relationship between a 
particular congressional committee, agency, and interest group. Because 
the only public works agency in Fenno's sample was the Bureau of 
Reclamation, we augmented this subsample by including data from three 
other agencies which sponsor construction projects - the Corps of 
Engineers, Military Construction, and the Economic Development Ad- 
ministration. The only other addition to Fenno's sample was the Na- 
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration, whose activities are con- 
centrated in a number of specific locations. 
In contrast to agencies in the first category, agencies in the second per- 
form services which are not directed toward specific interest groups, loca- 
tions, or segments of the population. Most are engaged in routine 
governmental operations, for example, law enforcement, revenue collec- 
tion, and minting currency. The others promulgate standards or gather 
scientific, economic, or demographic data. 
A taxonomy as simple as this one, of course, blurs over many important 
distinctions. Benefits supplied by some agencies in the first column ac- 
crue in a more direct fashion to a specific group than do the benefits of 
appropriations act appeared instead in a subsequent supplemental act. In such cases these 
appropriations were counted toward the agency's funding for that year. In all other cases the 
funds appropriated in deficiency and supplemental acts were for line items already covered in 
the regular annual act. As stated above, these figures were almost always very small, and 
they were not included in the following analyses. 
4 Our rationale for sticking as closely as possible to the Fenno sample was to insure that the 
findings of our analysis could not be attributed to our use of a highly idiosyncratic data set. 
The three agencies which were omitted were two divisions in the Labor Department (the 
Wage and Hours Division and the Women's Bureau) and the Social Security Administration. 
The first two were dropped because of their extremely small size, while the Social Security 
Administration was dropped because of the frequent incomparability of figures reported from 
one year to the next. 
5The only agency in the Interior Department not included in this category was the 
Geological Survey. Programs and agencies which were included but which are covered in 
funding bills other than those concerning Agriculture, Interior, or Public Works bills were 
Military Construction, the Economic Development Administration, the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration, the Vocational Rehabilitation Service, the Public Health Service, 
and the Office of Education. 
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TABLE 1 
AGENCIES CATEGORIZED BY THE NATURE OF THEIR BENEFITS 
AGENCIES SUPPLYING DIVISIBLE, AGENCIES SUPPLYING RELATIVELY 
CONSTITUENCY-ORIENTED BENEFITS INDIVISIBLE BENEFITS 
Extension Service Food and Drug Administration 
Farmers Home Administration Patent Office 
Rural Electrification Admin. Weather Bureau (1948-66) 
Soil Conservation Service Coast and Geodetic Survey (1948-66) 
Forest Service Geological Survey 
Bureau of Land Management Census Bureau 
National Park Service Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Bureau of Indian Affairs Imm. and Naturalization Service 
Fish and Wildlife Service (1948-71) Federal Prison System 
Bureau of Mines (1948-74) Bureau of Narcotics (1948-69) 
Bonneville Power Admin. (1949-75) Bureau of Customs 
Office of Education Bureau of the Public Debt 
Public Health Service (1948-69) Secret Service 
Office of Voc. Rehab. (1948-68) Internal Revenue Service 
NASA (1960-79) Bureau of the Mint 
Bureau of Standards (1948-73) 
PUBLIC WoRKS AGENCIES Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Bureau of Labor Standards (1948-68) 
Bureau of Reclamation 
Corps of Engineers 
Military Construction (1960-79) 
Economic Dev. Admin. (1966-79) 
Note: Most agencies in this sample existed continuously from FY1948 through FY1979. If 
they did not, the years in which they were in existence are reported. 
others. These agencies also differ in how geographically concentrated 
their beneficiaries are; consumers of electricity generated by the Bonne- 
ville Power Administration, for example, reside in several congressional 
districts in the Northwest, while the Office of Education has funded 
school construction in virtually every district in the country. It is also 
true that the character of an agency can change over time; the Sagebrush 
Rebellion, for example, suggests that the Bureau of Land Management is 
no longer as completely beholden to local ranching interests as McCon- 
nell's (1966) study had indicated. 
There were also a few agencies which did not fit as cleanly into the sec- 
ond category as we would have liked. To be sure, a purely indivisible 
public good exists only in theory - some groups or individuals will always 
consume more of a public good than others. Our strongest reservations, 
however, concerned the Bureau of the Mint and the Federal Prison 
System, which operate facilities in a fairly small number of specific loca- 
tions and which were occasionally appropriated relatively large amounts 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Thu, 18 Feb 2016 21:41:24 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS -ELECTORAL CONNECTION 69 
of funds for new construction. It is also the case that advertisers, 
developers, and similar enterprises have come to make heavy use of Cen- 
sus Bureau data and that the Customs Service has recently won favor from 
domestic clothing and appliance manufacturers for its enforcement of an- 
tidumping and counterfeit label statutes. For the most part, however, 
the benefits provided by these agencies were not, during the time period 
under consideration, targeted at a particular interest group or segment of 
the population. On the whole, then, the agencies listed in table 1 reside 
comfortably in the category to which they have been assigned. 
ESTIMATION 
Before proceeding there are some econometric issues which must be ad- 
dressed. First, as indicated earlier, OMB requests must be modeled as an 
endogenous variable. This requires estimation of the model by means of 
two-stage least squares regression or some similar technique.6 The next 
issue concerns the way in which the endogenous appropriations and OMB 
request variables are to be specified. Although we did not touch upon 
this point earlier, we feel it only makes sense to express our hypotheses in 
terms of real levels of funding. We thus converted the nominal requests 
and appropriations figures into constant (1972) dollars (deflation was 
based upon the Implicit Price Deflator for Federal Government Goods 
and Services). Second, virtually all accounts of the appropriations proc- 
ess stress that key decision makers within both branches consider proposed 
budgetary figures primarily in terms of the changes such figures represent 
over the previous fiscal year (Fenno, 1966; Wildavsky, 1974; Berman, 
1979). We therefore divided the real dollar OMB estimate and ap- 
propriations figures for each agency by the real dollar appropriations it 
received in the previous fiscal year, producing the two endogenous terms 
to be used in the analysis. 
Probably the most serious estimation problem derives from the small 
number of observations for each agency; the full time series is only thirty- 
two years long, and for some agencies there are many fewer observations 
than that. Pooling data across the thirty-seven agencies in the sample 
thus presents important advantages. We not only gain statistical 
leverage but also simplify the analysis, as each major hypothesis can be 
6 In developing their original models Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky (1966) recognized 
the interdependence between the actions of Congress and the OMB, and explicitly modeled 
the budgetary process as a simultaneous system (p. 536). They justified their use of ordinary 
least squares by assuming that the system was recursive, i.e., that the covariance matrix was 
diagonal. It is generally the case, however, that the error terms in multi-equation models in- 
corporate the effects of a common set of excluded explanatory variables. In such situations 
ordinary least squares estimates will be biased. Consistent estimates can be obtained with in- 
strumental variables techniques such as those used in this paper. 
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tested by estimating a single coefficient. There are, however, some 
caveats to be observed with this procedure. The first is cross-sectional 
correlation; factors which produce error in predicting appropriations for 
agency i in year t may be the same factors which produce error in predict- 
ing appropriations for agency j in year t. The resultant correlation be- 
tween error terms for the same year will bias estimates of the standard 
errors. It is thus important to check the degree of correlation between 
residuals for the various agencies. Second, the series of residuals for each 
separate agency should be checked for the presence of serial correlation, a 
problem which would reduce the efficiency of our estimates. 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The hypotheses we have proposed are of two types. The first pertains 
to the effects of certain economic and political variables upon appropria- 
tions decisions in general, while the second concerns the differential ef- 
fects of these variables upon different classes of federal agencies. As for 
the first set, we have hypothesized that Congress is more generous in its 
treatment of agency requests in election years than in nonelection years 
and that Congress responds to higher rates of unemployment by increas- 
ing agency appropriations, but decreases agency appropriations in 
response to higher rates of inflation. We also hypothesized that as the 
proportion of Democrats in office increases, so does the amount of funds 
agencies are appropriated, and that the larger the increase that an 
agency's OMB estimate represents over the previous year appropriations, 
the larger the increase Congress makes in its appropriations. Further- 
more, a transition from a Republican (Democratic) president who sub- 
mitted agency budget estimates to a Democratic president results in Con- 
gress awarding higher (lower) levels of appropriations than if the 
Republican had remained in office. We tested these hypotheses by 
estimating the following equation: 
ACONGit = a + 31AOMBit + f2Et + 03U-1 + f44t-1 (1) 
+ f35DEMt + f3STRANS, + fit, 
where: 
a = a constant term; 
ACONGit = appropriations (in constant dollars) awarded by Congress 
to agency i in fiscal year t as a proportion of what the 
agency had received in the previous fiscal year; if an 
agency's appropriations in year t is represented by CONGit, 
then ACONGi. = CONGtlICONG5, t-1; 
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AOMBi, = an instrumental variables estimate for appropriations (in 
constant dollars) requested by OMB for agency i in fiscal 
year t as a proportion of the appropriations that agency 
received in the previous fiscal year; if an agency's OMB es- 
timate in year t is represented by OMBjt, then AOMBi, = 
OMBitICONGi, t-1 ;7 
Et= 1 during election years (the second session of each Congress), 
0 otherwise; appropriations decisions concern the upcoming 
fiscal year, so appropriations considered by Congress dur- 
ing election years are for odd-numbered fiscal years; 
U-= the average rate of unemployment during the first six 
months of the session of Congress in which appropriations 
for a given fiscal year are considered; for FY1965 this 
measure would thus register the unemployment rate during 
the first half of calendar year 1964;8 
I = the (annualized) percentage change in the Consumer Price 
Index during the first six months of the session of Congress 
in which appropriations for a given fiscal year are consid- 
ered; 
DEMt = the percentage of seats in the House held by Democrats; 
TRANS = 1 during years in which a Democratic president replaces a 
Republican, -1 when the transition goes from the Repub- 
licans to the Democrats, and 0 otherwise. 
eit = a randomly distributed error term. 
Finally, in order to facilitate interpretation of the constant term, the 
unemployment, inflation, and partisan composition variables entered the 
equations as deviations from their mean values during this period. If the 
7The instrumental variables estimate of AOMB,, was created by imposing exclusionary 
restrictions - i.e., AOMB,, was regressed on the same variables as was ACONGi, in equation 1 
plus at least one additional variable - and the fitted values were used in equation 1 instead of 
AOMBi,. In this instance we actually specified several additional variables-dummy 
variables for the party of the president, for presidential election years, for war years (the 
Korean Conflict, FY1952-54, and Vietnam, FY1967-74), and the unemployment and infla- 
tion rates during the six months prior to the president's submission of the budget. This model 
was thus strictly overidentified. It should also be noted that the two-stage least squares pro- 
gram we employed made the requisite corrections to the estimated standard errors. 
8 As indicated earlier, research on economic conditions and voting behavior has generated 
persuasive evidence that voters respond retrospectively to past conditions, but that they tend 
to be myopic and have short memories. The short time frame used here thus assumes that at 
least in this respect members of Congress are like voters appear to be. (For a contrary view 
on this matter see Chappell and Keech, 1985.) 
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data support our hypotheses, the signs of all coefficients except that of the 
inflation term should be positive. Results are reported in table 2. 
TABLE 2 
THE EFFECTS OF EXOGENOUS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL VARIABLES 
UPON CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS DECISIONS, FY1948-79 
(2SLS Estimates) 
VARIABLE VARIABLE 
Constant .717** Inflation -.552** 
(.166) (.225) 
OMB Requesta .307* Unemployment 1.177* 
(.149) (.601) 
Proportion Democrats .271* Administration Transition .035 
(.114) (.022) 
Election Year .028* 
(.012) 
N = 1038 
Note: Data for the Census Bureau for fiscal years 1950, 1951, 1960, 1961, 1970, and 1971 
were deleted because of the distortive effect of the constitutionally mandated decennial cen- 
suses. 
a Endogenous variable. 
* = p < .05. 
** = p < .01. 
The results of this analysis provide strong support for each of our 
hypotheses. All coefficients are in the predicted direction. Six are 
statistically significant, and the other (the coefficient of the transition 
term) falls just short of the conventional p < .05 level. Turning first to 
the economic variables, we see that during this period a 1 percent increase 
in the unemployment rate led, ceteris paribus, to a nearly 1.2 percent real 
increase in the appropriations awarded to these agencies in the subse- 
quent fiscal year. This finding thus bears out Fenno's (1966) observation 
that economic downturns give rise to permissive moods toward spending. 
Conversely, a 1 percent increase in the Consumer Price Index has led 
Congress to reduce appropriations to these thirty-seven agencies by about 
0.5 percent. This effect, however, could arise from mechanisms other 
than that which was hypothesized, that is, that Congress acts in a 
countercyclical fashion purposely to hold down government spending 
during inflationary periods. It could be that Congress actually seeks to 
maintain "current service levels" by keeping real dollar appropriations 
constant, but it is hampered by imperfect expectations of inflation rates. 
If Congress behaved as if it had "adaptive" expectations, for example, it 
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would tend to underestimate the next fiscal year's inflation rate during 
periods of rising inflation (and thus "under-appropriate") and overesti- 
mate inflation (and thus "over-appropriate") during periods when infla- 
tion is slowing down. Whatever the case, in this realm Congress has 
definitely not increased real spending levels under the guise of compen- 
sating for inflation. 
As hypothesized, appropriations decisions are also influenced by the 
electoral calendar. The estimated coefficient of the election year dummy 
indicates that, everything else being equal, these agencies received about 
2.8 percent more in congressional election years than in nonelection years. 
Given the spate of recent studies questioning various elements of the Tufte 
(1978) scenario (McCallum, 1978; Golden and Poterba, 1980; Thompson 
and Zuk, 1983; Brown and Stein, 1982) the apparent impact here of 
election-year considerations is surprisingly strong. 
It would be a mistake, however, to construe this evidence of an "elec- 
toral appropriations cycle" as a congressional source of political business 
cycles. Such cycles are alleged to result from more expansive fiscal 
and/or monetary policies which incumbent politicians pursue so as to 
generate a surging economy on election day. The agencies and programs 
analyzed in this study, though, are only a modest sample of those in ex- 
istence. They do not include "big ticket" national defense and transfer 
payment programs, and so they account for only a small fraction of total 
government spending. Appropriations figures also reveal little about the 
actual timing of government expenditures, as the check-writing authority 
they represent can be for activities extending a number of years into the 
future. These data probably do suggest something about the willingness 
of incumbent politicians to influence the short-term course of the 
economy, but shed little light on their ability to do so. 
Agency appropriations are also a function of the partisan composition 
of Congress. The .27 coefficient for this variable implies that it would re- 
quire the election of around seventeen additional Republicans (i.e., a 4 
percent increase in the share of seats held by that party) to lower these 
agencies' appropriations by 1 percent in real terms -a fairly modest ef- 
fect. However, considering the context of the American Congress -an 
extremely decentralized legislature not noted for high levels of party 
discipline -this is impressive evidence that it does make a difference how 
many Democrats or Republicans are elected. 
Finally, the signs of the endogenous AOMBi, and administration transi- 
tion terms were in the predicted positive direction, indicating that con- 
gressional appropriations decisions also accommodate the preferences of 
the president.9 Thus, if the president (by way of the OMB estimate) were 
9Estimation of the reduced form AOMBj, equation strongly confirmed our expectations 
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to ask for a 10 percent real increase in an agency's appropriations over the 
previous fiscal year, the agency will receive from Congress, ceteris 
paribus, a 3 percent increase. Within the typical range of OMB requests, 
the effect of this variable combined with the very large constant term 
(.31 + .72) implies a large degree of continuity in the size of agency 
budgets from year to year - or, if you will, that budgetary change is 
usually incremental.'0 
The coefficient of the transition term was surprisingly large; replace- 
ment of a Democratic president by a Republican, according to this 
estimate, leads Congress to appropriate about 3.5 percent less to a given 
agency than if the Democrat had remained in office. It is likely, 
however, that presidential influence in Congress is at a peak during the 
first year of an administration. The memory of the election is still fresh, 
and the president's popularity is likely to be as high as it is ever going to 
be."l 
Finally, analysis of residuals indicated that these results were not com- 
promised by potential econometric difficulties. First, the correlation be- 
tween the residuals from one agency and those from another tended to be 
positive, but barely so (most of the Pearson r statistics lay between .00 and 
.20, and the number of associations which were statistically significant 
was only slightly larger than that which would be expected by chance).'2 
The other potential violation of the Gauss-Markov assumptions of concern 
here is serial correlation. Unfortunately, calculation of a Durbin- 
Watson statistic is not appropriate with pooled data. What we did in- 
stead was to estimate equation 1 separately for the thirty-seven agencies 
in our sample with ordinary least squares and to calculate a Durbin- 
Watson for each equation. These statistics registered little serial correla- 
that the OMB submits larger budget estimates during Democratic administrations and that 
OMB budget estimates were held down during periods of war. In contrast to congressional 
appropriations, however, inflation and unemployment rates did not appear to affect OMB re- 
quests systematically, nor did the presence of a presidential election year. See Kiewiet and 
McCubbins (1984) for an extensive analysis of presidential (OMB) behavior in the appropria- 
tions process. 
10 The coefficient of the OMB term was considerably larger (approximately .8) when 
equation 2 was estimated with OLS regression. The OLS coefficients of the other exogenous 
variables, however, were all surprisingly close to the 2SLS coefficients reported in table 3. 
" In a recent paper Rivers and Rose (1985) show that the president's success in getting his 
program through Congress is a function of his popularity. The model they estimated was 
similar to ours in that the president's actions (how many bills he introduced) and the actions of 
Congress (the percentage of bills they passed) were formulated'as endogenous variables. 
12 As a final check on the specification of our model we reestimated it after including 
agency-specific dummy variables in both equations. Doing so resulted in only trivial changes 
in the coefficients of interest but did produce a tremendous increase in computational costs. 
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tion; in only seven of the thirty-seven equations were they less than 1.5 or 
greater than 2.5. Given that neither pooling nor two-stage estimation in- 
duces any additional serial correlation, we believe that considerable con- 
fidence can be placed in these results. 
In short, the evidence in table 2 indicates that major exogenous 
economic and political variables clearly influence congressional ap- 
propriations decisions. To be sure, the effects observed here are not 
massive; if incrementalism is simply taken to mean budgeting by "small 
steps" (Schick, 1982), our results pose no real challenge to this notion. If 
incrementalism is taken to imply that budgetary outcomes are merely the 
product of standard bureaucratic procedures and programmatic inertia, 
however, these results indicate otherwise. 
ANALYSIS OF AGENCY-SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES 
In several instances we predicted that the variables we are investigating 
would have more (or less) influence upon decisions regarding agencies 
which supply divisible, constituency-oriented benefits - especially public 
works agencies - than upon those regarding agencies which supply 
primarily indivisible benefits. To test these hypotheses we will estimate 
an equation which allows the coefficients of the explanatory variables to 
vary across the three subgroups of agencies. Quickly to summarize, we 
hypothesized that the tendency for Congress to treat agency requests more 
generously in election years is stronger for those agencies which supply 
divisible, constituency-oriented benefits - especially public works - than 
for agencies which supply largely indivisible benefits. We predicted the 
same pattern of results for unemployment. Although inflation might 
well affect agency budgets in a similar manner, there is also reason to 
believe that high rates of inflation do not alter the relative attractiveness 
of funding different types of agencies. We also reasoned that those agen- 
cies which supply divisible benefits - especially public works agen- 
cies - would be less subject to partisan controversy than line agencies 
whose benefits are relatively indivisible. Finally, we also felt it would be 
prudent to estimate separate constant terms for each different type of 
agency in order to determine whether or not they experienced different 
long-term budgetary growth rates. 
There are a number of equivalent ways to specify a model which would 
test these hypotheses. The form we adopted was what is commonly re- 
ferred to as a "switching regime" model (Maddala, 1977, p. 136), wherein 
a separate constant, unemployment, election year, and partisan composi- 
tion coefficient is estimated for each of the three subsets of agencies. This 
equation, then, is as follows: 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Thu, 18 Feb 2016 21:41:24 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
76 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 47, 1985 
ACONGit = ai + (d + bpw + 'y1(iU-1) + 'Y2(dUt1) (2) 
+ Y3(pwUt1) + 74(iIf1) + -5(dIt1) + 7y(pwI,1) 
+ y77(iDEMt) + 78(dDEM.) + -y9(pwDEM.) + 'y10(iEt) 
+ 7'11(dEt) + 712(pwE.) + 'Y13AOMBit + 'Y14TRANS 
+ t 
where ACONGit, AOMBit, DEMt, Ue1, It-, E., and It are defined as be- 
fore; i = 1 if the ith agency supplies indivisible benefits, 0 otherwise; 
d = 1 if the ith agency supplies divisible benefits (excluding public 
works), 0 otherwise; and pw = 1 if the ith agency supplies public works, 
0 otherwise. Equation 2 thus does not specify an overall constant term. 
If the data support our hypotheses, the coefficient of the unemploy- 
ment term should be larger for agencies which supply divisible, 
constituency-oriented benefits than the coefficient for the indivisible 
benefit agencies, and should be largest for public works agencies (Y3 
> 'Y2 > YI). The same ordering should hold for the unemployment 
terms (Y12 > 'Y1 > 'y o) and, because the signs should be negative, for 
the inflation terms (,y > 'y5 > 'y4). The reverse order should hold for 
coefficients of the partisan composition terms (ye > yg > 'yio). Results 
are reported below in table 3. 
A comparison of the results reported in table 3 with those from table 2 
reveals that relaxing restrictions on the unemployment, inflation, party 
composition, and election-year terms did not perturb the estimated coeffi- 
cients of the presidential influence variables; the AOMBi, and administra- 
tion transition terms are virtually identical across the two equations. 
Replacing the overall constant term with the three agency-type dummy 
variables was also of no consequence, as the coefficients of all three cluster 
around .7. Also as before, analysis of residuals revealed little evidence of 
either cross-sectional or serial correlation. 
Our hypothesis regarding unemployment received an important degree 
of support in table 3: congressional response to high rates of joblessness 
was particularly strong with regard to those agencies which sponsor major 
construction projects. A 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate 
was associated with a nearly 5 percent increase in appropriations for these 
agencies in the subsequent fiscal year. The difference between this coef- 
ficient and both of the others was significant at the .05 level. Congress 
has thus reacted to high levels of joblessness in much the same manner as 
have governments going back to the pharaohs -with more and/or bigger 
public works projects (Garraty, 1978). On the other hand, there was not 
much difference between the coefficient for the other divisible benefit 
agencies and the coefficient for the indivisible benefit agencies (the latter 
was in fact marginally smaller than the former). 
It also appears that agencies which supply relatively indivisible benefits 
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TABLE 3 
THE EFFECTS OF EXOGENOUS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL VARIABLES 
UPON CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS DECISIONS FOR DIFFERENT 
TYPES OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, FY1948-79 (2SLS ESTIMATES) 
TYPE OF AGENCY 
INDIVISIBLE DIVISIBLE PUBLIC 
VARIABLE BENEFITS BENEFITS WORKS 
Constant .706* * .745** .681** 
(.168) (.164) (.165) 
Unemployment 1.086 .312 5.731 * * 
(.806) (.903) (1.822) 
Inflation -.636* -.460 -.374 
(.304) (.354) (.682) 
Proportion Democrats .408** .312* -.776* 
(.153) (.171) (.460) 
Election Year .028 .028 .033 
(.018) (.019) (.040) 
PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE VARIABLEsa 
OMB Requestb .305* 
(.149) 
Administration Transition .036* 
(.022) 
N = 1038 
Note: Data for the Census Bureau for fiscal years 1950, 1951, 1960, 1961, 1970, and 1971 
were deleted because of the distortive effect of the constitutionally mandated decennial cen- 
suses. 
a Coefficients of these variables are constrained to be the same across all types of agencies. 
b Endogenous Variable. 
* 
= p < .05. 
** = p< 
.01. 
bear more of the brunt of an inflation-induced "economy mood" than do 
those which supply relatively divisible benefits, and that the public works 
agencies are trimmed the least. Only the coefficient of the indivisible 
benefit agencies was significantly less than zero. Unfortunately, a conse- 
quence of estimating a separate coefficient for the three subsets of agen- 
cies in our sample is a larger standard error for each coefficient than for 
the single coefficient estimated in the previous analysis. The t statistics 
are thus smaller, and the differences among these three coefficients are 
not significant. While these results are thus in keeping with our 
hypothesis, they are too fragile to place a great deal of confidence in 
them. 
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Our hypothesis regarding the differential impact of election years upon 
the three different types of agencies did not fare very well at all. All 
three estimated coefficients were virtually identical to the single .028 
election-year term in table 2. Findings concerning the partisan composi- 
tion of the House were similar; although the coefficient for the indivisible 
benefit agencies was slightly larger than that for the divisible benefit 
agencies, this difference is far from being statistically significant. Prob- 
ably the most surprising result is that of the party variable for public 
works agencies. While we had hypothesized agencies of this type to be 
particularly insensitive to the partisan composition of the House, they ap- 
pear instead to be especially sensitive in the opposite direction than we 
had supposed. The negative significant coefficient indicates that ap- 
propriations for public works agencies actually increase, everything else 
held constant, as the number of Republicans increase. We are inclined 
not to make too much of this single coefficient. Perhaps, though, David 
Stockman's unflattering remarks about the robustness of his Republican 
colleagues' opposition to federal spending were even more justified than 
he had thought. 
All in all, then, our decision to distinguish between different types of 
agencies was at least partially justified. Although our hypotheses 
concerning the differential effect of election years and party shares in the 
House were not borne out, our hypotheses concerning major economic 
variables did receive some empirical backing. The budgets of divisible 
benefit agencies appeared to hold up better during periods of inflation 
than the budgets of agencies which supply largely indivisible benefits. 
Congressional treatment of public works agencies, moreover, conformed 
nicely to the hypotheses derived from our electoral connection model, as 
appropriations awarded to these agencies were far more sensitive to the 
unemployment rate than were appropriations for other agencies. 
The final issue we need to address concerns the generalizability of these 
results. As indicated earlier, the budgets of the agencies in this sample 
make up only a small fraction of total federal appropriations in a given 
fiscal year. But they do account for a sizable proportion of appropria- 
tions which are "controllable," and so we believe the results of our 
analyses can be generalized to all controllable expenditures. Any broader 
generalizations, however, are probably unwarranted. Estimation of our 
model on "uncontrollable" spending - for example, social welfare expend- 
itures -might well have yielded a different pattern of results (Browning, 
1983), as might estimation based upon units of analysis which differed 
greatly from individual federal agencies (Natchez and Bupp, 1973). 
Finally, Brady and Morgan's (1983) study of appropriations reforms 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries suggests that the 
influence of various exogenous variables was probably different during 
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earlier periods in history. We are confident, however, that nothing has 
happened since these data were gathered which would undermine the ac- 
curacy of the model's predictions of agency appropriations in the future. 
Indeed, we are currently planning to gather data from the first few 
Reagan fiscal years and put our confidence to the test. On the surface, 
however, the events of recent years seem entirely consistent with our 
model. In the year following Reagan's election, with inflation very high 
and unemployment still fairly low, Congress, which at that time con- 
tained a relatively large number of Republicans, acceded to a large share 
of the cuts Reagan proposed in the budgets of domestic agencies. A few 
years later, with inflation back under 5 percent and unemployment 
around 10 percent, a Congress containing twenty-six additional 
Democratic representatives was considerably more generous in its treat- 
ment of domestic agency budget requests. 
CONCLUSION 
The electoral connection model of congressional appropriations deci- 
sions examined in this paper was broadly informed by the assumption that 
members of Congress respond to the demands and exigencies of their en- 
vironment in such a way so as to maximize their probability of reelection. 
Analyses of appropriations for thirty-seven federal agencies between fiscal 
years 1948 and 1979 strongly supported the hypotheses derived from this 
model. First, Congress has been more generous in awarding appropria- 
tions during election years than during nonelection years. Congressional 
appropriations decisions are also influenced by prevailing economic con- 
ditions. Higher unemployment leads to higher levels of appropriations, 
especially for public works agencies. Congress has consistently re- 
sponded to high rates of inflation by holding down agency appropria- 
tions. Appropriations decisions also registered the effects of party dif- 
ferences: the larger the percentage of Democrats in the House of 
Representatives, the more funds agencies were appropriated. These 
results, then, identify another important policymaking domain where 
parties do matter (Hibbs, 1977; Cameron, 1978). 
This study adds to a growing body of research which examines the im- 
pact of relevant exogenous variables upon budgetary decisions (Caldeira 
and Cowart, 1980; Padgett, 1981; Kamlet, Mowery, and Fischer, 1983; 
Mowery and Kamlet, 1982; Fischer and Kamlet, 1984; Winters and 
Reidenberg, 1983). As indicated earlier, the results of our analyses do no 
violence to notions of incrementalism, if this is simply taken to mean 
"budgeting by small steps." Our results, however, do challenge the in- 
crementalist implication that budgetary outcomes are merely the product 
of standard bureaucratic operating procedures and programmatic inertia. 
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APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES 
Presidential budget requests (in the form of OMB estimates) and final 
appropriations figures are reported in the Annual Senate Document Ap- 
propriations, Budget Estimates, Etc., the section entitled "Itemized Com- 
parisons of Budget Estimates and Appropriations Arranged by Senate 
Acts." 
The deflator used to convert the appropriations and estimates figures 
into constant dollars was the Implicit Price Deflator for Federal Govern- 
ment Purchases of Goods and Services. The time series for this deflator 
was taken primarily from The National Income and Product Accounts of 
the United States, 1929-74, Statistical Tables. Data after that date are 
taken from monthly issues of the Survey of Current Business. Both are 
published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Com- 
merce. 
The unemployment and the Consumer Price Index figures were taken 
from issues of the Monthly Labor Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
U.S. Department of Labor. 
These data are available upon request. 
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